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CAVEAT CLOUDSTER: WHY TRADITIONAL COMMON AND CIVIL 
PROPERTY LAW SHOULD APPLY TO VIRTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT 
WILL CHANGE THE LEGAL REALITIES OF THE INTERNET† 
Matthew Quadrini* 
ABSTRACT 
With the increasing trade in and production of virtual content (e-books, digital 
music, files stored in the cloud, etc.) and an ever growing use of virtual real 
estate (email accounts, online storefronts, URLs, etc.) in commercial 
transactions, the legal interest users hold in their virtual property will determine 
whether all have the power to prosper in this new, multi-billion-dollar virtual 
economy. In the cloud, service providers can grant or destroy scores of virtual 
property with the click of a button and without compensation—a power not 
even available to the Canadian government. 
As it stands, the legal regime governing virtual property is economically 
and socially unviable. The extension of traditional property law principles to 
new types of virtual property would better protect the reasonable expectations 
of parties involved in these electronic transactions. This article defines virtual 
property and its legally relevant characteristics before turning to examine the 
licensed-but-not-sold contractual regime that governs virtual property today. 
It argues that virtual property more closely resembles physical property than 
intellectual property. In addition, it concludes that utilitarianism and 
personality theory justify the creation of a legal duty for service providers to 
protect the interests that users maintain in their virtual property. Lastly, the 
author suggests how the creation of property rights in virtual property might 
come about and offers a starting point for future debate as to the nature of the 
rights that ought to be recognized. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The rise of cloud computing1 has been described as “the latest example of 
Schumpeterian creative destruction:2 creating wealth for those who exploit it; and 
leading to the demise of those that don’t.”3 Over the last 15 years, the Internet 
has begun to digitize much of the human experience. This shift has revolutionized 
not only how we communicate, but also our economy and, in some cases, the 
reality in which we choose to live our lives. While the use of the Internet to 
communicate, to store information, and to generate wealth has grown 
exponentially over this period,4 the legal interest that users have in their virtual 
property will influence the ability for all to prosper in this new virtual economic 
space.  
Although virtual property is designed to mimic physical property, the use of 
the licensed-but-not-sold sales model by service providers prevents users from 
obtaining or maintaining a property interest in the virtual property that they 
“purchase” or store in cyberspace. This raises interesting questions as to what 
happens to users’ virtual property upon the demise of a service provider. 
Technology writer Nicholas Carr aptly summarizes the dilemma: 
Discontinued products and services are nothing new, of course, but 
what is new with the coming of the cloud is the discontinuation of 
services to which people have entrusted a lot of personal or otherwise 
important data—and in many cases devoted a lot of time to creating 
and organizing that data. As businesses ratchet up their use of cloud 
services, they’re going to struggle with similar problems, sometimes on 
a much greater scale. I don’t see any way around this—it’s the price we 
pay for the convenience of centralized apps and databases—but it’s 
                                                                                                                                            
1  In this paper, cloud computing refers to the delivery of on-demand computing resources to users by 
service providers via the Internet, which allows users to store, manage, purchase, and process data using 
the servers of that third-party service provider or one of its subcontractors: “What is cloud?”, online: IBM 
Canada <www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/ca/en/what-is-cloud-computing.html>. 
2  Schumpeterian creative destruction describes the process of “industrial mutation […] that incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating 
a new one.” See Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2003) at 83. 
3  Joe McKendrick, “10 Quotes on Cloud Computing That Really Say it All”, Forbes (24 March 2013), online: 
<www.forbes.com/sites/joemckendrick/2013/03/24/10-quotes-on-cloud-computing-that-really-say-it-
all> (Quoting Joe Weinman, Senior VP at Telx and author of Cloudonomics: The Business Value of Cloud 
Computing). 
4  Goran Čandrlić, “How Much is Stored in the Cloud” (3 April 2013), online: GlobalDots <www.global 
dots.com/how-much-is-stored-in-the-cloud>. 
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worth keeping in mind that in the cloud we’re all guinea pigs, and that 
means we’re all dispensable. Caveat cloudster.5 
Virtual property, unlike physical property, can only exist with the support of 
a series of computer servers owned and operated by third parties. These external 
requirements make the regulation of virtual property a clash between users who 
hold virtual property rights and service providers who operate the systems or 
create the back-end code upon which virtual property rests. Through the use of 
End User License Agreements (EULA) and Terms of Service (TOS), service 
providers harness contract and intellectual property law to leave users with little 
to no right in their virtual property and minimizing their own liability should their 
systems fail to operate.6 By employing the licensed-but-not-sold concept, these 
same agreements operate as a “shrewd attempt by [service providers] to… 
eliminate ownership and knock out the market for used digital goods before it 
has a chance to establish itself.”7 
As these contracts of adhesion generally feature stringent arbitration clauses, 
consumers have limited opportunities to challenge these artificially created virtual 
property regimes in court. Exacerbating this problem is the fact that service 
providers promptly settle disputes where such arbitration clauses are rendered 
inoperable.8 Yet, despite these contracts being so clearly stacked in the service 
provider’s favour, these disputes raise questions as to whether users can ever 
claim property rights in virtual properties, including those that they “purchase” 
through the licensed-but-not-sold model, and whether these transactions create 
an obligation for service providers to protect the resulting property interest.  
The trade in virtual goods (driven by the cloud, the consumption of digital 
media, and social gaming) has seen exponential growth in the last decade, despite 
the unfavourable contracting conditions to which users have been subjected. 
Business spending on cloud-related technologies is projected to reach an 
                                                                                                                                            
5 McKendrick, supra note 3 (quoting Nicholas Carr, author of The Shallows, The Big Switch, and Does IT 
Matter?). 
6  “World of Warcraft Terms of Use” (22 August 2012), online: World of Warcraft <us.blizzard.com/en-
us/company/legal/wow_tou.html>. 
7  Matt Peckham, “ReDigi Lets You Resell Used Digital Music, But Is It Legal?”, Time Tech (26 June 2012), 
online: Time <techland.time.com/2012/06/26/redigi-lets-you-resell-used-digital-music-but-is-it-legal>. 
8  Greg Lastowka, Virtual Justice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010) at 19. 
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estimated $235.1 billion USD in 2017, triple the $78.2 billion spent in 2011.9 In 
addition, the consumption of digital content, such as e-books, digital music, 
downloaded video games, and mobile applications, is higher than ever with more 
people now spending more time using digital media than offline media.10  
Due to the limited number of large-scale shutdowns of service providers, 
consumer confidence has remained relatively unaffected even as vast amounts of 
virtual property have been destroyed. One of the few large-scale shutdowns of a 
service provider was that of Megaupload, a provider of online file storage and 
sharing that US authorities closed on January 19, 2012 for allegedly participating 
in copyright infringement. This left the virtual property of hundreds of thousands 
of users in limbo, and much of the data stored on the company’s servers has 
already been deleted.11 Legal claims by former Megaupload users, such as Kyle 
Goodwin, with respect to their lost files demonstrate the precariousness of virtual 
property and could set a precedent for future virtual property claims.12  
Traditional positivist justifications for the recognition of property rights, as 
well as the nature of virtual property, justify the creation of property rights in 
virtual property that service providers would have an obligation to respect. This 
article examines how the Canadian common and civil law of property could treat 
the recognition of property rights in virtual property and how they could assist in 
defining the scope of the service provider’s obligation to respect the user’s 
property interest.  
                                                                                                                                            
9 “Cloud Related Spending by Businesses to Triple from 2011 to 2017” (14 February 2014), online: IHS 
<press.ihs.com/press-release/design-supply-chain/cloud-related-spending-businesses-triple-2011-2017>. 
10  Ozoda Muminova, “Digital overtakes offline media” (28 March 2013), The Guardian Digital Media Trends 
(blog), online: <www.theguardian.com/advertising/digital-media-trends-digital-overtakes-offline>. 
11  John Brodkin, “Megaupload data wiped out in ‘largest data massacre in Internet history’”, Wired (20 June 
2013), online: <www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-06/20/dotcom-data-deletion>. 
12  Kyle Goodwin’s intervention in USA v Kim DotCom will examine the nature of the property interest that 
users have in property they upload onto cloud storage, as well as the rights that these users have over third 
parties who lease their servers to service providers. Megaupload granted users licences comparable to other 
cloud storage service providers (exclusion of liability, no guarantee of service, etc.). The US government 
claims that, although users maintain copyright in their uploaded content, users do not retain an ownership 
interest in the property they upload. On the other hand, Goodwin asserts a property interest in his 
uploaded files, without going so far as to claim virtual property rights. See Cindy Cohn & Julie Samuels, 
“Megaupload and the Government’s Attack on Cloud Computing”, online: Electronic Frontier 
Foundation <www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/governments-attack-cloud-computing>; Brief of 
Interested party Kyle Goodwin (30 March 2012), online: Electronic Frontier Foundation <www.eff.org/ 
document/brief-interested-party-kyle-goodwin>; Richard Chirgwin, “Files aren’t property, says US 
government”, The Register (4 November 2012), online: <www.theregister.co.uk/2012/11/04/eff_feds_ 
goodwin_megaupload>.  
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This article defines virtual property and its legally relevant characteristics in 
Part 2. It then examines the current regime governing virtual property, created by 
EULAs and TOS agreements, in Part 3 before arguing that virtual property more 
closely resembles physical property than intellectual property in Part 4. These 
characteristics should be reflected in the way that virtual property is regulated. In 
Part 5, the article demonstrates how utilitarianism and personality theory support 
the creation of an obligation for service providers to respect the property interest 
users have in their virtual property. Part 6 suggests how property rights in virtual 
property could come about. Finally, Parts 7 and 8 consider how the Canadian 
common and civil law could adapt to recognize user rights in virtual property, as 
well as the nature of the rights created.  
With regard to the two latter claims, this article raises a series of legal issues 
that are likely to arise if and when property rights in virtual property are 
recognized. It offers modest suggestions as to how these rights might be 
enforced. It does not purport to establish an unequivocal legal basis for virtual 
property rights, but rather aims to identify a starting point for future debate. 
2. WHAT IS VIRTUAL PROPERTY? 
In discussing virtual property, the relevant unit of analysis is a line of 
computer code.13 When one claims to own an article of virtual property, one is in 
fact claiming ownership of a line of computer code. At its core, computer code 
is “the symbolic arrangement of data or instructions in a computer program or 
the set of such instructions.”14 This data exists as “quantities, characters, or 
symbols on which operations are performed by a computer, being stored and 
transmitted in the form of electrical signals and recorded on magnetic, optical, or 
                                                                                                                                            
13  Susan Abramovitch & David Cummings, “Virtual Property, Real Law: The Regulation of Property in 
Video Games” (2007) 6 CJLT 73 at 75. 
14 Princeton WordNet Search, sub verbo “computer code”, online: Princeton <wordnetweb.princeton.edu/ 
perl/webwn>. 
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mechanical recording media.”15 Within cyberspace, code is essentially an infinite 
resource, which can be replicated at little or no cost. 
2.1 The Three Characteristics of Virtual Property 
Virtual property is distinguishable from traditional code sequences. 
Although both traditional code sequences and virtual property are computer 
code, the major distinctions between the two result from the physical hardware 
required to support the code and its corresponding capabilities. Professor Joshua 
Fairfield defines virtual property as having three legally relevant characteristics 
not shared with regular code: “virtual property is rivalrous, persistent, and 
interconnected code that mimics real world characteristics.”16 As numerous 
scholars in the civil law and common law traditions have accepted these three 
characteristics, they form the basic definition of virtual property for the purpose 
of this article. 
2.1.1 Rivalrousness  
Firstly, according to Fairfield, code must be rivalrous to constitute virtual 
property. The quality of rivalrousness requires that the code be designed to allow 
users to exclude others such that the user can retain sole possession.17 For 
example, an email account is rivalrous if only one individual can access the 
account, while the email address itself is a unique link to the particular account. 
However, code does not need to be unique in order to be rivalrous. Several users 
may individually own an identical code sequence to a virtual sword in an online 
game like World of Warcraft, just as two individuals can own identical cars in the 
real world. These code sequences may be identical, but each user is said to own a 
unique copy such that the user is the only holder of that particular code sequence 
and others may be excluded from using it. Rivalrousness is an essential 
                                                                                                                                            
15 The Oxford English Dictionary, sub verbo “data”, online: Oxford Dictionaries <www.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/american_english/data>. 
16  Joshua Fairfield, “Virtual Property” (2005) 85 BUL Rev 1047 at 1053. 
17  Ibid at 1054. 
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characteristic for the recognition of property rights in virtual property because 
property rights are exclusive.18 
2.1.2 Persistence  
Secondly, for code to constitute virtual property it must be persistent: 
“Persistence is the quality of an object having longevity. The [user’s] virtual shovel 
remains in existence in the virtual world, and it remains the property of that [user], 
even after he or she logs out of the virtual world.”19 Moreover, to be considered 
virtual property, the code must be accessible from more than one computer.20 
The property must exist in cyberspace and must continue to exist irrespective of 
the state of the device on which the user accessed it. Thus, an email account or a 
plot of virtual land in an online game would be considered persistent because it 
continues to exist after the user logs out of his or her account and is accessible 
when the user logs back in on a different computer. Persistence is an essential 
characteristic for the recognition of property rights in virtual property as property 
rights are perpetual.21 
2.1.3 Interconnectedness 
Finally, to constitute virtual property code must be interconnected with the 
world around it. Like physical property, virtual property does not exist in a 
vacuum.22 As such, virtual property must be experienced in the same way by 
different individuals and must be subject to the rules governing the technological 
space in which it operates, much like how physical property is subject to the laws 
of physics. Interconnectivity also presupposes “the capability to convey or 
transmit virtual objects among different users. It is what allows players to trade 
                                                                                                                                            
18  Stéphane Gilker & Charles Lupien, “Le droit de propriété dans les mondes virtuels en droit civil 
québécois” in Service de la formation continue: Développements récents en droit du divertissement, vol 311 (Cowansville: 
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2009) 155 at 202. 
19  Abramovitch & Cummings, supra note 13.  
20  Fairfield, supra note 16 at 1054. 
21  Gilker & Lupien, supra note 18. 
22  Fairfield, supra note 16 at 1054. 
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virtual goods either in a given virtual world or in the real world.”23 Simply put, 
the interconnectivity of virtual property allows others to experience and share 
virtual property. A website’s URL is thus considered interconnected as “the value 
of a URL is not solely that the owner can control it; the value is that other people 
can connect to it and can experience it.”24 
2.2 Examples of Virtual Property  
Virtual property exists in many different forms and places throughout 
cyberspace. However, studies discussing virtual property have generally focused 
on the virtual property amassed by individuals who play massively multiplayer 
online role-playing games (MMORPGs) such as Second Life, There.com, World 
of Warcraft, and Entropia Universe.25 However, virtual property does not only 
concern gamers. If one accepts Fairfield’s definition of virtual property as 
rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected code that mimics real world 
characteristics, then virtual property touches many of our everyday online 
activities. Under this definition, virtual property can be classified into two broad 
categories: (i) virtual content and (ii) virtual real estate.  
Virtual content is not limited to items bought within the game environments 
of MMORPGs, but also includes any other form of content or media hosted by 
a third-party service provider. This includes e-books, digital music, files stored in 
the cloud, emails, digital currency, and games.26 Unlike virtual real estate, these 
lines of code are generally considered to be no less real than their physical 
counterparts, as the content (e.g. the melody of a song, the words of an email, the 
value of a currency, etc.) remains the same regardless of the media supporting it.27 
This digital content may reside on a personal hard drive; however, service 
providers often require or induce users to store their content on third-party 
servers or use third-party software by promising value-added services. When a 
                                                                                                                                            
23  Abramovitch & Cummings, supra note 13. 
24  Fairfield, supra note 16 at 1054.  
25  MMORPGs are games where users interact with a large number of other players using avatars as 
intermediaries in a virtual environment managed by a service provider. Players work together to 
accomplish tasks, using their avatars to collect items that enable them to complete tasks more efficiently.  
26  Fairfield, supra note 16 at 1055–8. 
27 Greg Lastowka & Dan Hunter, “The Laws of the Virtual World” (2004) 92:1 Cal L Rev 1 at 49. 
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user accesses digital content through a service provider, the code underpinning 
the content acquires virtual property status since it becomes both persistent and 
interconnected. 
Virtual real estate, on the other hand, consists of subdivisions of cyberspace 
that generally have value because of the goodwill attached to them. Such 
properties include email addresses, bank accounts,28 web pages, and URLs.29 In 
addition to mimicking real world spaces, these subdivisions of cyberspace 
maintain the characteristics of rivalrousness, persistence, and interconnectedness. 
First, the user ultimately controls who has access and can exclude others from 
taking over the space.30 Second, these spaces exist regardless of the state of the 
user’s computer and can be accessed from any other computer. Finally, these 
spaces exist as “interconnected loci” within cyberspace and allow users to 
experience the virtual property that they contain.31 
3. THE LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING VIRTUAL PROPERTY  
The growth in digital media consumption has occurred despite EULAs and 
TOS agreements characterizing virtual property as intellectual property, which is 
subsequently licensed to users. These contracts of adhesion are designed to limit 
liability by licensing virtual property to users and stifling the creation of emergent 
property interests. However, users generally do not read these contracts and 
typically treat virtual property as though they have a property interest in the 
code.32 Many users invest large sums of money or place valuable electronic 
                                                                                                                                            
28  A bank account may be one of the earliest forms of virtual property: “The owner of an account has an 
exclusionary right over a nexus of electronic credits and debits located at that nexus. The bank account is 
persistent—even though the account balance is merely an entry, that entry remains in the bank if 
undisturbed. The bank account is interconnected—other people can send money to the account, and the 
owner of the account can authorize money to flow to other account holders” (Fairfield, supra note 16 at 
1057). 
29  Ibid at 1055–8. 
30  Ibid at 1057. 
31  Ibid.  
32  In 2007, the grey market trade for virtual goods in World of Warcraft employed over 100,000 people in 
China and had a value between $1.5 and $2 billion USD. The game’s producer has repeatedly attempted to 
crackdown on this grey market by shuttering the accounts of those users involved or by filing complaints 
with their financial institutions. See Wade Roush, “Live gamer Aims to Civilize the Gray Market for 
Virtual Goods”, Xconomy (21 December 2012), online: <www.xconomy.com/boston/2007/12/21/ live-
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content in these virtual environments, unaware of the risks of potentially 
imminent termination. Therefore, the question emerges as to whether the law 
should tolerate the use of “consensual agreements that prevent formation of 
property rights in the first instance any more than we tolerate other consensual 
restraints on alienation.”33 
3.1 Virtual Property as Governed by Intellectual Property Law and Contract  
A combination of intellectual property law and contract law governs virtual 
property. The virtual environments within cyberspace consist of code that gives 
the space functionality and creates the graphical representations of virtual 
property. Copyright law is the main source of “protection for computer programs 
and other works in digital form.”34 As a result, intellectual property law governs 
these representations, “[creating] a right to exclude on the part of the intellectual 
property holder that can be exercised to eliminate emergent virtual property 
rights.”35 However, as computer code can only be used to control how the virtual 
world or service interacts with the user, service providers “use contract to govern 
what occurs supplementary to the workings of the virtual world.”36 These 
contracts encompass “features of proper [use] and decorum that cannot be easily 
written into computer code,” allowing service providers to confirm the licensor-
licensee relationship between themselves and the user.37 
                                                                                                                                            
gamer-aims-to-civilize-the-gray-market-for-virtual-goods>; Trung Bui, “Blizzard Cracks Down on ‘World 
of Warcraft’ Gold Farmers”, Game Rant (21 January 2011), online: <www.gamerant.com/blizzard-cracks-
down-world-warcraft-gold-farmers-trung-63961>. See also Justin Slaughter, “Virtual Worlds: Between 
Contract and Property” (2008) [unpublished, archived at Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository] 
online: Yale <digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/62> at 25 (footnote). 
33  Fairfield, supra note 16 at 1083–4. 
34  Barry Sookman, Computer, Internet and Electronic Commerce Law (Scarborough: Carswell, 2007) at 3-2.1.  
35  Fairfield, supra note 16 at 1082. 
36  Abramovitch & Cummings, supra note 13 at 76–7. 
37  Ibid at 76.  
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3.2 Recurring Themes in the Governance of Virtual Property through 
Intellectual Property and Contracts  
Generally, the interest a user receives in virtual property takes the form of a 
revocable licence to use the virtual property.38 For example, the terms of service 
for Amazon.com’s Kindle e-book service frame the user-provider relationship as 
follows: 
[T]he Content Provider grants you a non-exclusive right to view, use, 
and display such Kindle Content an unlimited number of times, solely 
on the Kindle…and solely for your personal, non-commercial use. 
Kindle Content is licensed, not sold, to you by the Content Provider.39  
Of course, companies take a variety of approaches to issuing accounts and 
virtual property licences. For instance, the virtual world Second Life grants users 
a limited licence to access virtual land, which it defines as a 
…graphical representation of three-dimensional virtual world space. Linden Lab 
[Second Life’s developer] may or may not charge fees for the right to 
acquire, transfer or access Virtual Land, and these fees may change at 
any time. 
When you acquire Virtual Land, Linden Lab hereby grants you a limited 
license (“Virtual Land License”) [sic] to access and use features of the Service 
associated with the virtual unit(s) of space corresponding to the identifiers of 
the Virtual Land within the Service as designated by Linden Lab.40 
In other cases, EULAs grant no interest to users in virtual property. For example, 
the terms and conditions for Apple Inc.’s iCloud service state that: “Nothing in 
this Agreement shall be construed to convey to you any interest, title, or license 
[sic] in an Apple ID, email address, domain name, iChat ID, or similar resource 
used by you in connection with the Service.”41 
While the nature of the interest conferred to users varies from service to 
service, service providers’ use of licensing generally enables providers to maintain 
                                                                                                                                            
38  Slaughter, supra note 32 at 29. 
39  Amazon.com, Kindle Store Terms of Use (7 December 2012), online: <www.amazon.ca/gp/help/customer> 
[emphasis added]. 
40  Linden Labs, Linden Labs Terms of Service, online: <www.lindenlab.com/tos> [emphasis added].  
41  Apple, iCloud Terms and Conditions (17 September 2014), online: <https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-
services/icloud/en/terms.html>. 
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control over the virtual property base code. Along with the rights granted under 
section 3 of the Copyright Act,42 service providers also use EULAs and TOS to 
effectively control the user’s ability to alienate virtual property. These contracts 
prevent users from transferring, selling, or trading virtual property even after they 
have “purchased” it from service providers. Blizzard Entertainment, the 
developer of World of Warcraft, uses terms that are typical of the industry: 
Blizzard owns, has licensed, or otherwise has rights to all of the content that appears 
in the Game. […] Blizzard does not recognize any purported transfers 
of virtual property executed outside of the Game, or the purported 
sale, gift or trade in the “real world” of anything that appears or 
originates in the Game. Accordingly, you may not sell in-game items or currency 
for “real” money, or exchange those items or currency for value outside of the 
Game.43 
Such restraints on alienation are not limited to virtual worlds; they extend to other 
forms of virtual property such as e-books and cloud storage. The Kindle terms 
of use similarly state that: 
Unless specifically indicated otherwise, you may not sell, rent, lease, 
distribute, broadcast, sublicense, or otherwise assign any rights to the Kindle 
Content… In addition, you may not bypass, modify, defeat, or 
circumvent security features that protect the Kindle Content.44 
Moreover, service providers use licensing agreements to limit the transfer of 
virtual property to the user’s estate once the user dies, thereby depriving the user’s 
estate of access to potentially valuable information stored in cyberspace. For 
instance, the terms and conditions for Apple’s iCloud state: 
You agree that your Account is non-transferable and that any rights to 
your Apple ID or Content within your Account terminate upon your 
death. Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate your Account may be terminated 
and all Content within your Account deleted.45 
                                                                                                                                            
42  Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 3. 
43  Blizzard Entertainment, World of Warcraft Terms of Use (22 August 2012), online: Activision Blizzard, Inc 
<us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/wow_tou.html> (last visited 26 June 2015) [emphasis added]. 
44  Amazon.com, supra note 39 [emphasis added]. 
45  Apple, supra note 41 [emphasis added]. 
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Service providers also generally retain the right to terminate a user’s account 
without cause. The Barnes and Noble Nook Store TOS state that: 
Where reasonableness is required by applicable local laws, we may, 
upon notice to you, issue a warning, temporarily suspend, indefinitely 
suspend or terminate your NOOK account or your access to all or any part 
of the NOOK Service, NOOK Store, NOOK Store Content and/or 
your NOOK Library for any reason in our sole discretion…46  
The excerpts above demonstrate that EULAs and TOS agreements almost 
exclusively characterize virtual property as intellectual property, granting users a 
revocable licence to use the service and its content. These agreements impose 
strict penalties and give service providers broad power and discretion to protect 
their contractually characterized interests, leaving little to no flexibility for users.  
4. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR MAINTAINING RIGHTS IN  
VIRTUAL PROPERTY 
While EULAs and TOS agreements characterize virtual property as 
intellectual property, its rivalrous nature makes such a characterization 
inappropriate. While the intellectual property and contract regime for virtual 
property has become a common industry standard, “virtual property rights are 
actually a very poor match for intellectual property law.”47 Despite the Federal 
Court of Appeal’s affirmation in Apple Computer, Inc v Mackintosh Computers Ltd 
that code falls within the definition of a “literary work” under section 2 of the 
Copyright Act,48 it is generally recognized that “virtual property is somehow 
‘different’” from intellectual property.49 
The differences between intellectual and virtual property stem from virtual 
property’s rivalrous nature. While copyright “protects no particular object owned 
by a particular person; instead…[granting] a right to prevent the replication of a 
                                                                                                                                            
46 NOOK Media, NOOK Store Terms of Service, online: Barnes & Noble <www.barnesandnoble.com/ 
include/nook_video_terms_of_use.asp> (last visited 26 June 2015) [emphasis added]. 
47  Lastowka, supra note 8 at 168. 
48  Apple Computer, Inc v Mackintosh Computers Ltd, [1990] 2 SCR 209 at 215, 71 DLR (4th) 95. 
49  Fairfield, supra note 16 at 1050. 
68 VIRTUAL PROPERTY Vol. 24 
particular abstract information pattern (e.g. the sequence of words in a book),” 
virtual property is an interest in a particular piece of copyrighted code, which itself 
is the manifestation of the intellectual property interest and which is subject to 
“exclusive possession and market alienation.”50 
Code forming virtual property contains a complementary, yet separate 
interest from the intellectual property creating it. Fairfield explains:  
We understand instinctually and logically that ownership of a thing is 
always separate from ownership of the intellectual property embedded 
in a thing. Ownership of a book is not ownership of the intellectual 
property of the novel that the author wrote. The book purchaser owns 
the physical book, nothing more. Ownership of a CD is not ownership 
of the intellectual property in the music. The music purchaser owns 
that copy of the music, nothing more.51 
Using Fairfield’s analogy, it is possible to conclude that virtual property has 
a dualistic nature that allows both property and intellectual property interests to 
co-exist. For example, an author retains an intellectual property interest in the 
arrangement of the words that form the basis of an e-book, which is distinct from 
the property interest in the rivalrous code sequence forming the e-book that is 
subsequently purchased by, or licensed to, the user.52 
5. TRADITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROPERTY LAW SUPPORT THE 
RECOGNITION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN VIRTUAL PROPERTY 
Notwithstanding the conclusion that virtual property more closely 
resembles physical property than intellectual property, the creation of a property 
interest in virtual property is an entirely positivist construct. As virtual property 
is intangible, it is difficult to unravel the various competing Lockean claims 
between service providers and users to form a universal theory of virtual 
property.53 Nevertheless, it is possible to develop a uniform approach to virtual 
                                                                                                                                            
50  Lastowka, supra note 8 at 169. 
51  Fairfield, supra note 16 at 1096.  
52  Ibid. 
53  Steven Horowitz, “Competing Lockean Claims to Virtual Property” (2007) 20:2 Harv JL & Tech 443 at 
454–5, 457. A Lockean claim is a traditional justification for the creation and protection of property rights, 
according to which property is used as a means to compensate an individual for the labour he exerts upon 
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property if one assumes a positivist perspective, which views the law of property 
as a larger series of “entitlements created by law.”54 As Jeremy Bentham 
explained, “Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws 
were made there was no property; take away laws and property ceases.”55 In other 
words, property cannot be meaningfully understood apart from the rights that it 
confers on some while excluding others. Two philosophical justifications—
utilitarianism and personality theory—best illustrate the economic and social 
implications of virtual property, as well as the need to recognize users’ property 
rights in it. Each theory is examined below.  
5.1 A Utilitarian Justification for the Recognition of Property Rights in 
Virtual Property  
From a utilitarian perspective, the allocation of private property interests is 
justified on the basis that it increases overall utility.56 Utilitarianism adopts a 
“simple bright-line policy” to justify the creation of a private property interest.57 
As a result, “Jeremy Bentham’s ‘felicific calculus’ and the utilitarianism that flows 
from it have become the dominant justification for the creation of private 
property.”58 To determine the net impact on utility, the question becomes “a 
matter of empirical fact”59 by calculating the aggregate result of the positive and 
negative impacts of the property interest. Thus, a utility calculus must analyze the 
net impact of recognizing a particular interest, including the impacts on users, 
service providers, and society as a whole.   
                                                                                                                                            
a thing in its natural state. Where the user must labour to produce property in a virtual world, it is difficult 
to distinguish the Lockean claims of the creator of the virtual environment (who laboured to create the 
environment in which the virtual property exists) and that of the user (who laboured in order to make the 
virtual environment produce the code sequence), as the contributions of both creator and user are at least 
partly responsible for the existence of the virtual property. 
54  Bruce Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 2. 
55  Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation, vol 1 (Bristol: Thoemmes, 2004) at 113. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27 at 44. 
58  Ibid.  
59  Theodore Westbrook, “Owned: Finding a Place for Virtual World Property Rights” (2006) Mich St L Rev 
779 at 796. 
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Liberalizing the market for virtual property and granting users property 
rights in virtual property presents an opportunity to establish a new virtual 
economic space from which the whole of society can benefit. Today, despite the 
risks associated with owning virtual property (due to the lack of rights afforded 
to users in the content they “purchase”), the trade in virtual goods continues to 
grow. Still, the consumption of virtual content comes at great risk to consumers. 
As discussed above in Part 3.2, service providers generally only offer users 
licences in the content they “purchase.” As part of this arrangement, service 
providers reserve the right to cancel service at any time and without cause, 
destroying billions of virtual objects in the process. Moreover, through EULAs 
and TOS agreements, service providers limit how a user can use his or her virtual 
property within the limits prescribed by copyright law.  
Granting users a property interest in virtual property would permit them to 
use virtual property as a means for transferring wealth. Doing so would validate 
not only the importance of the economy in virtual goods (and its attendant 
societal benefits), but also the efforts of those that have toiled in virtual 
economies. Although a lot of virtual property is of a recreational or personal 
nature, the net benefit to individuals as a result of granting users rights in their 
property is far from trivial: 
…when viewed in light of the utilitarian notion that social good is 
equivalent to aggregated individual good. Clearly, with millions of 
people spending billions of hours per year within virtual worlds, the 
aggregated benefit to individuals could be colossal.60   
While each virtual object is of varying value to the outside world, “it is clear from 
the amount of real-world time and money invested in…virtual property [that] 
individuals place a very high value on the virtual objects they create”61 or 
purchase.  
This was certainly true for Ai Jun and Xu Wenjun, two of the 7 million store 
managers who have used the Chinese e-commerce platform Taobao, which 
                                                                                                                                            
60  Ibid. 
61  Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 27 at 45. 
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operates much like eBay.62 Ms. Jun and Mr. Wenjun’s online stores had earned 
high consumer satisfaction ratings, increasing the web properties’ values by 
boosting consumer confidence and maximizing sales.63 In 2012, the shopkeepers 
died suddenly, prompting Taobao to shutter their accounts and delete their client 
lists, despite requests by their families to the contrary.64 Jun and Wenjun’s estates 
lost the valuable assets that the shopkeepers had spent countless hours creating.65  
Society has an interest in protecting user data stored in the cloud too. Society 
places great value in library books as a way of communicating knowledge, yet 
cloud computing has assumed a much greater role in the storage and transmission 
of information than a library ever could. A 2013 study by Nasuni, a cloud storage 
infrastructure service provider, concluded that over one exabyte66 of data was 
stored in the cloud at that time, equal to one-fifth of all the information created 
from the dawn of civilization to 2003.67 Without the recognition of property 
rights in virtual property, this enormous quantity of information is precariously 
placed. EULAs and TOS agreements allow profit-motivated service providers to 
maintain total control over this information, which frequently represents a user’s 
livelihood, personal information, or patrimonial memory. 
Furthermore, society stands to gain by applying the dispute resolution 
mechanisms it has developed for physical property to virtual goods. The law of 
property has developed a robust series of dispute resolution mechanisms to 
protect and allocate property interests. These mechanisms are well suited to 
virtual property, which closely mimics real-world property. As elaborated below, 
property law can effectively define the nature of a user’s interest in virtual 
property and unlock access to legal remedies and dispute resolution mechanisms 
already available at law.  
                                                                                                                                            
62  Zhou Wenting, “Taobao clears dust over divorcing clients”, China Daily (27 July 2013), online: 
<www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-07/27/content_16839702.htm>. 
63  Zhao Qian, “Virtual inheritance”, Global Times (10 September 2012), online: <www.globaltimes.cn/ 
content/732274.shtml>. 
64  Wenting, supra note 62. 
65  Taobao.com has since changed its policy regarding the transfer of store ownership due to demands by 
managers who share the management of stores with family members. See ibid. 
66  One exabyte is equivalent to one billion gigabytes. 
67  Čandrlić, supra note 4. 
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While recognizing property, as opposed to contractual, rights in virtual 
property will have a positive impact on users, service providers will bear the 
burden of respecting these new interests. Some programmers, including Richard 
Bartle, have suggested the burden will be great. Indeed, service providers will have 
greater obligations than those currently created by EULAs and TOS 
agreements.68 However, the impact of legal reform will be tempered by the norms 
of each service.69 Many of these obligations would have little or no impact on the 
operations of service providers who already incorporate user rights to vary 
extents in EULAs and TOS agreements. For example, requiring notice on 
termination of the service so that users can retrieve their information or allowing 
the estate of a deceased user to access the information contained in the user’s 
email account may already be standard practice. However, an obligation to back 
up users’ data or to prevent modifications to a service that would devalue users’ 
virtual property interests could come at a greater cost.  
Still, the recognition of property interests in virtual property is probably 
justifiable from a utilitarian perspective. As the cost to the service provider to 
protect a user’s virtual property interest is essentially an economic one, it will 
ultimately be borne by the user himself. In fact, if service providers download this 
cost onto the user, then the user’s decision to bear the cost will confirm the 
existence of a net benefit in the creation of a private property interest. The 
prospect of a net benefit is further supported by society’s interest in the 
protection of information, as well as the opportunity that service providers have 
to spur new investment in new virtual property interests.   
                                                                                                                                            
68  Richard Bartle argues that, as a concept, virtual property transforms the role of a service provider into that 
of a “custodian” of property interests, rather than an owner. This will force service providers to ensure 
that virtual property retains its value and would put “severe—perhaps impossible—constraints on 
[designers].” See Richard Bartle, “Pitfalls of Virtual Property” (April 2004), online: The Themis Group 
<www.themis-group.com/uploads/Pitfalls%20of%20Virtual%20Property.pdf>. 
69  See Part 8.2, below. 
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5.2 A Personality Theory Justification for the Recognition of Property Rights 
in Virtual Property: The Social Importance of Virtual Property  
In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Georg Hegel claims that private property 
is essential for the moral development of the human person.70 Hegel’s personality 
theory posits that “to achieve proper self-development—to be a person—an 
individual needs some control over resources in the external environment.”71 As 
Bruce Ziff explains: 
Hegel saw property as a dominant factor in the transformation of 
people from abstract entities into moral and political beings distinct 
from others. A liberation, a transcendental shift, resulting from 
projecting one’s will into an external object. Such an object having no 
end in itself, then becomes subservient to the will of the claimant.72 
Modern personhood theory generally distances itself from Hegel’s view of 
“property as a sine qua non of human growth and individuality,” focusing instead 
on how people regard the items they purchase as an outward expression of their 
identity or character.73 When one loses his or her belongings—whether they be 
clothes, cars, homes, or personal homepages—the individual feels a sense of 
loss.74 Ziff argues that our acquisitiveness as humans is a “natural disposition for 
such things as sustenance, self-defence, and self-worth” and therefore supports 
the “primordial need” for some form of property institution.75   
Most users have an attachment to virtual property that personality theorists 
would claim creates a property interest. The strength of this attachment varies 
with the degree of personality attached to the property.76 Since virtual property 
mimics or replaces physical property, the personality theory link between an 
individual and his or her property is equally replicable in cyberspace.  
                                                                                                                                            
70  Georg Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, vol 1 translated by William Hastie (London: K Paul, Trench, 
Trübner & Company, 1891).  
71  MJ Radin, “Property and Personhood” (1982) 34 Stan L Rev 957 at 957. 
72  Ziff, supra note 54 at 30. 
73  Ibid at 30–1. 
74  Ibid. 
75  Ibid at 31.  
76  Westbrook, supra note 59 at 798. 
74 VIRTUAL PROPERTY Vol. 24 
In virtual worlds, an emotional connection exists between a user, the avatar 
he or she uses to explore the virtual environment, and the virtual property he or 
she purchases. Several cases have documented this phenomenon. In 2005, Qiu 
Chengwei, a player of the popular MMORPG Legend of Mir, killed Zhu Caoyuan 
after the latter had stolen Chengwei’s Dragon Saber.77 The Dragon Saber is a 
potent weapon that takes many hours of play to acquire, and was valued at $1,000 
USD or half the Chinese average annual income at the time.78 Chengwei had lent 
the sword to Caoyuan, a trusted friend, who then sold it for real cash instead of 
giving it back.79 When Chengwei reported the property stolen, the police were 
“of the opinion that the Dragon Saber…was not legal property” and refused to 
press charges. This drove Chengwei to take the law into his own hands, stabbing 
Caoyuan with a real knife.80 
To be sure, the personal interest in virtual property extends well beyond the 
realm of virtual worlds. For instance, service providers retain incredible powers 
over a user’s virtual property. With the press of a button, service providers can 
grant or destroy innumerable amounts of virtual property, subverting the effort 
expended or value accumulated by the user. This power is without equal: “By 
analogy, the Bank of Canada, the Prime Minister, or the Queen of England, could 
neither decide to put an end to Canada nor dispossess you of your property 
without compensation.”81  
Service providers have dispossessed users of their virtual property on 
countless occasions in compliance with their EULAs and TOS agreements, 
inflicting significant economic and social losses upon users. For instance, in 
several cases the families of US soldiers who died during military operations were 
unable to access their loved ones’ emails on Yahoo.com. Although these families 
asked Yahoo to preserve the accounts, the company denied their requests, citing 
privacy concerns, and confirmed its intention to delete the information following 
                                                                                                                                            
77  Lastowka, supra note 8 at 19–22. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Paul Chênevert, “La propriété dans les univers virtuels: un droit réel ou un droit personnel?” (2011) 2:1 
Bulletin de Droit Économique 29 at 33 [translated by author]. 
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the 120-day grace period established by the TOS.82 While some families 
eventually succeeded in compelling Yahoo to turn over the information by court 
order, there are probably many more instances in which a user’s valuable personal 
information, such as access codes and bills, were simply deleted without the 
knowledge of the user’s estate.83 The soldiers’ email correspondence, like other 
forms of writing, was an outward expression of their personalities. Its destruction 
constitutes a loss, and personality theorists would argue that this justifies the 
recognition of a property interest in virtual property.  
Moreover, by abstracting personality theory, if one examines the image of 
society and the dynamics of how this image is created by the “inventory of the 
images of the individuals who compose the society,” then society as a whole 
arguably has an interest in recognizing property rights in virtual property.84 
Kenneth Boulding claims that “every public image begins in the mind of some 
single individual and only becomes public as it is transmitted and shared.”85 If the 
image of a society is the subjective knowledge transmitted from one generation 
to the next,86 then the important volume of information stored by users on third-
party servers forms an important portion of the “transcript of society,” the 
preservation of which is invaluable to the establishment of a value system within 
it.87 Thus the ability of the aggregate of this information to form the basis for 
societal self-development would, from a personality theory perspective, justify 
society exercising some control over the information resources in cyberspace 
through the recognition of property rights for the individual user in virtual 
property.  
                                                                                                                                            
82 Ariana Cha, “After Death, a Struggle for Their Digital Memories”, The Washington Post (3 February 2005), 
online: <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58836-2005Feb2.html>. 
83  Olivia Truong, “Virtual Inheritance: Assigning More Virtual Property Rights” (2009) 21 Syracuse Sci & 
Tech LR 57 at 83. 
84  Kenneth Boulding, The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1956) at 54. 
85  Ibid at 64. 
86  Ibid at 5–6. 
87  Ibid at 72–3. 
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6. RECOGNIZING USERS’ PROPERTY RIGHTS IN VIRTUAL PROPERTY IS ALL BUT 
INEVITABLE 
Existing law has become socially and economically unviable as a result of 
the growing importance of virtual property, coupled with the perception of 
permanence surrounding virtual environments. As the utilitarian and personality 
theory analyses above demonstrate, economic value and individual expression 
increasingly appear in the form of virtual property. The current juridical 
framework is problematic because service providers systematically prevent users 
from acquiring a property interest in virtual property, despite the fact that it often 
looks and feels just like physical property.88 While limiting rights by contract is 
nothing new, the rights attached to traditional ownership set minimum standards 
that would be lost if they could simply be contracted away. The illusion of 
possession created by EULAs and TOS agreements is therefore troubling because 
the familiar look and feel of virtual property perpetuates the reasonable 
perception of ownership and longevity, which artificially inflates virtual property’s 
economic and social value.  
There are at least three scenarios that would likely lead to the recognition of 
property rights in virtual property. First, service providers could grant users 
greater rights in their virtual property in response to consumer pressure or to 
improve market share. Second, after a service provider exercises its rights under 
an EULA or TOS document, a court could invalidate the characterization of 
virtual property as essentially contractual in nature and grant users property rights 
in it. Third, a provincial government could legislate a property regime for virtual 
property if it foresees the termination of a popular service. 
6.1 Service Providers Could Grant Users Property Rights in Virtual Property 
as a Means to Increase Market Share 
In response to market diversification, innovation, and consumer demand, 
companies have already begun to grant users greater rights in virtual property 
through their EULAs and TOS. For example, the service provider MindArk, 
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maker of the MMORPG Entropia Universe, allows users to sell virtual property 
both inside and outside the game; accepts virtual currency in the game to purchase 
real world items; and empowers a user’s legal successors to liquidate the user’s 
account following the user’s death.89 However, users are not the only ones with 
cause to celebrate: this differentiation has helped MindArk attract investments 
from virtual land developers. This form of investment has been conspicuously 
absent from MMORPGs operating under the more restrictive licensing terms 
described above.  
Moreover, consumers are increasingly sophisticated and frequently resist 
efforts to move toward service provider control over content. The release of 
Microsoft’s Xbox One offers a notable example. When the company announced 
the gaming console’s release, it included a series of new digital rights management 
protocols designed to limit the re-sale of used video games and offer new game-
sharing services. In effect, users would no longer own the games they purchased, 
including those who bought physical copies on a disc.90 This announcement was 
met with an immediate consumer backlash that prompted Microsoft to reverse 
its decision and give users ownership in their games, similar to what was available 
for users who purchased an Xbox 360.91 However, in reversing its decision, 
Microsoft restricted game sharing via the cloud to paying subscribers who have 
an Xbox Live Gold membership.92 
The cases of MindArk and Microsoft demonstrate that users are not only 
willing to participate in virtual environments where virtual property rights are 
protected, but that they will also pay a premium to do so. Furthermore, they show 
that service providers are willing to recognize these property rights and that 
sufficient demand exists to absorb the costs of the increased risk associated with 
                                                                                                                                            
89  MindArk, Entropia Universe Account Terms of Use (13 September 2013), online: <legal.entropiauniverse.com/ 
legal/terms-of-use.xml>. 
90  Tom Bramwell, “Microsoft kills game ownership and expects us to smile”, Eurogamer.net (7 June 2013), 
online: Gamer Network <www.eurogamer.net/articles/2013-06-07-microsoft-kills-game-ownership-and-
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complications (updated)”, Engadget (19 June 2013), online: AOL <www.engadget.com/2013/06/19/xbox-
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92  Alan Buckingham, “Microsoft details how Xbox One game-sharing will work”, Betanews (9 August 2013), 
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legal reform. Therefore, service providers might attempt to capitalize on user 
demands for property rights in virtual property in order to remain competitive 
and to maximize revenues.  
6.2 Judges Could Intervene to Grant Users Property Rights in Virtual 
Property as a Matter of Public Policy 
As the value and volume of investments by users in virtual property continue 
to increase, courts might eventually interpret EULAs and TOS agreements in a 
manner that redefines a user’s interest in virtual property on public policy 
grounds. This could occur if a motivated user (or group of users) were to 
challenge the validity of the licence granted by a mainstream service provider after 
experiencing bankruptcy, a disruption of service, or a loss of information due to 
server damage caused by humans or natural disaster.93 In these situations, courts 
must recognize that users are increasingly vulnerable to the widespread unilateral 
termination of EULAs and TOS agreements as a result of their ever-increasing 
investments in virtual property.94 This vulnerability is further exacerbated by the 
practice among some service providers of renting server space from third parties.   
It would not be unprecedented for courts to reinterpret the legal relationship 
between parties who have consented to a licensing agreement. In the early to mid-
twentieth century, courts used public policy as a reason to modify the relationship 
between parties based on the factual circumstances surrounding their 
relationship. Considering the important social and economic claims that stem 
from virtual property, courts—especially in common law jurisdictions—may 
come to treat virtual property licensing much like they have historically treated 
the licence agreements between theatre owners and patrons or licences to rent 
property.95 
                                                                                                                                            
93  Sebastian Anthony, “Megaupload’s demise: What happens to your files when a cloud service dies?”, 
ExtremeTech (20 January 2012), online: Ziff Davis <www.extremetech.com/computing/114803-
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94  Brodkin, supra note 11. 
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landlords to avoid statutory protections” for tenants “through the creation of residential licences” (Ziff, 
supra note 54 at 293). It is possible that courts will come to acknowledge that the rivalrous, persistent, and 
interconnected nature of virtual property grants exclusive possession to its holder, precluding the 
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granted is a tenancy” (ibid). Per Strong J in Lynch v Seymour (1888), 15 SCR 341 at 352, 1888 CarswellAlta 2 
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6.3 Provinces Could Legislate a Virtual Property Regime 
As mentioned above in Part 4, intellectual property law is actually a very 
poor match for the governance of virtual property. While there exists a dual 
property interest in virtual property (namely the author’s copyright in the code 
sequence and the user’s property right in the particular rivalrous code sequence), 
provinces have an opportunity to independently regulate virtual property.96 If the 
rivalrous code sequence forming virtual property is considered property like that 
described in Part 4, then under section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867,97 the 
regulation of virtual property would fall to the provinces as the arbiters on 
property and civil rights. 
This would allow provinces to develop independent regimes designed to 
attract service providers or protect users’ rights in virtual property; however, from 
a public policy perspective, the recognition of a user’s property interest in virtual 
property would most effectively foster the growth of a virtual economy and 
increase social welfare. Thus, a province might want to legislate the creation of a 
new property regime and, in doing so, sidestep the federal government’s 
jurisdiction over intellectual property. 
7. TRADITIONAL PROPERTY LAW ALREADY RECOGNIZES THAT VIRTUAL 
PROPERTY CAN BE SUBJECT TO A PROPERTY INTEREST 
In the event that one of the three scenarios discussed in Part 6 occurs, and 
the use of intellectual property and contract law to govern virtual property is 
                                                                                                                                            
(WL), a tenancy is created when a user is granted the exclusive right of entry with the power to use the 
property at issue. By contrast, a licence is created when the right of access to the property is “incidental” to 
the use. Although the licence granted by service providers may not bestow rights in virtual property, the 
rivalrous and persistent nature of virtual property does, in fact, give the user exclusive possession of the 
property in question. For example, even though a user receives no rights in the email address or user ID 
for Apple’s iCloud, only the user can use that code to send and receive information in the account. 
Moreover, the right in the virtual property is inseparable from the use because without the address the 
account would not be able to connect with the rest of cyberspace or receive information.  
96  Legislating property rights in virtual property is not unprecedented: Fairfield, supra note 16 at 1086. A 
November 23, 2001 Taiwanese regulation promulgated by the Ministry of Justice expressly stated that 
virtual objects are property, are alienable and transferable, that actions on such objects or accounts are 
found in property, and that the theft of such property is fully punishable under criminal law. 
97  Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(13), reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5. 
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rejected, it is important to understand the nature of the interest that traditional 
law grants to users in their virtual property. Both the common law and civil law 
recognize that the intangible nature of virtual property does not prevent virtual 
property from being subject to a property interest. However, there are two 
interests that come into play with any property-based regime for virtual property: 
(i) the user’s interest in a rivalrous, interconnected, and persistent line of code; 
and (ii) the user’s right to access this line of code on the servers of the third-party 
service provider. This second right of access both makes the virtual property’s 
existence possible and is essential to its utility. Together, these two property 
interests must ultimately ensure that virtual property is subject to the same rules 
of private ownership and market alienation that guide the tangible assets they are 
coded to emulate. 
7.1 How the Common Law of Property Would Apply to Virtual Property  
7.1.1  Common Law Recognizes a Property Interest in Intangible Virtual 
Property 
The incorporeal nature of virtual property does not preclude the recognition 
of a property interest in it. At common law, property denotes “everything which 
is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, 
visible or invisible, real or personal.”98 This definition demonstrates that the 
common law has long recognized rights in intangible interests in property because 
it “is not concerned with…[things], but rather with the rights of persons with 
respect to [those things].”99 Notably, the common law has long recognized 
interests in intangible financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, and bank 
accounts. In the case of financial instruments, the analogy between rights over 
intangible property and virtual property is even more apt as the digitization of 
financial markets has rendered most financial instruments becoming little more 
than lines of computer code.100  
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Moreover, the claim that virtual property purchased from service providers 
is kept artificially scarce and that its value can be dramatically altered by a few 
keystrokes should not preclude it from being considered an item of value.101 Most 
manufactured items are kept artificially scarce to maximize revenue from 
consumer demand.102 For example, manufacturers of rare or prestigious items, 
such as trading cards or designer handbags, often produce limited quantities to 
inflate prices.  
Finally, the fact that virtual property resides on the servers of a third party 
does not suppress the formation of a user’s property interest. Just as the servers 
themselves can be owned by one party and placed in a building owned by another, 
different parties can own virtual property and the hard drive to which it is affixed. 
7.1.2  To the Extent that the Common Law Recognizes Virtual Property 
Rights, It Must Recognize an Interest Akin to an Easement  
Without giving the user a right to access his or her virtual property stored 
on the service provider’s servers, the recognition of virtual property rights would 
be of limited value. As the Megaupload case demonstrates, even if a user receives 
a right in virtual property, the continued existence of that right is entirely 
dependent on the continued support of the service provider: 
Users, purchasers, and sellers of virtual property are all interested in a 
thing that depends on the operation of software, computing 
equipment and, most importantly, computer servers. To the extent that 
virtual property rights exist, virtual owners will be constrained in the 
free use of their own computing equipment. The existence of 
easements demonstrates that it is fairly conventional to constrain 
private rights in tangible property in order to enforce someone else’s 
lesser interest in that property.103  
As a result of the user’s dependence on the service provider, the law of 
easements provides an interesting starting point to analyze how the user’s right 
to access virtual property could come about, so as to give value to the user’s 
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property interest. The easement is a “versatile” tool of property law,104 which 
recognizes for public policy reasons that constraints on the right of ownership 
may exist for the benefit of another’s property interest. Easements commonly 
exist as a right-of-way or a right to use property, and they can take the form of 
any “privilege, service, or convenience which one [neighbour] has of another, by 
prescription, grant, or necessary implication, and without profit.”105 Moreover, 
the right associated with it can be implied from the fulfillment of a contractual 
obligation, such as the signing of an EULA or TOS document.106 
The analogy that the creation of a property interest in virtual property would 
create an easement-like interest is particularly apt given the similarities between 
land and the service provider’s hard drive. Both are foundational to the existence 
of the property. For example, in the physical world, it would be impossible to 
build a house unless there was land on which the foundation could be laid. On 
the Internet, lines of code cannot be rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected (and 
therefore fall within the definition of virtual property) unless they are stored on a 
third party’s server. The right being claimed by users is no more than the 
electronic equivalent of a right of access that, in its physical form, has long been 
recognized at common law.107 A right of access eliminates the risk that a service 
provider would block users from accessing the portions of the service provider’s 
hard drive where their virtual property resides.  
7.2 The Rigidity of Quebec Civil Law Poses Challenges to the Recognition of 
a Property Interest in Virtual Property 
Unlike the common law, Quebec civil law is less flexible in accommodating 
emergent property interests.108 Unfortunately, the concept of virtual property is 
foreign to the Civil Code of Quebec (CCQ), despite the Code’s relatively recent 
adoption in 1994. While the civil law of Quebec would likely recognize data 
generally as constituting corporeal movables, which may be subject to the creation 
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of property interests, the civil law today is poorly suited to protecting ownership 
interests in virtual property.  
The civil law of property makes a distinction between une chose (a thing) and 
un bien (a right within one’s patrimony). However, “[o]bjective property law is 
interested not in things themselves, but in the property rights which exist in 
relation to things.”109 In order for a property right to exist, the thing over which 
the right is being asserted, whether corporeal or incorporeal, is categorized as 
either a movable or an immovable and must be subject to appropriation.110 
7.2.1  Quebec Civil Law Recognizes that Virtual Property is a Corporeal 
Movable 
Characterizing the nature of virtual property depends on the definition one 
assigns to the matter making up the code sequence from which virtual property 
derives its existence. “In its essence virtual property is immaterial and intangible,” 
as it is impossible to physically interact with the property itself.111 However, while 
it is impossible to physically grasp a virtual sword, the existence of the virtual 
object has a very real impact, notably on the hard drive of the service provider’s 
server. As explained in Part 2, virtual property is essentially an organized series of 
electrical signals that are stored on a hard drive by changing the polarity on the 
face of the hard drive’s disk. Accessing this information transforms it into energy 
that then moves from the server, across the Internet to the computer accessing 
it. The question is whether the organized electrical signals and the subsequent 
modification of magnetic fields on the hard drive qualify as a corporeal movable 
under article 906 of the CCQ.  
While the civil legal tradition does not generally recognize property interests 
in incorporeal property,112 article 906 states: 
                                                                                                                                            
109  Pierre-Claude Lafond, Précis de droit des biens (Montréal: Thémis, 1999) at 4–5. 
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Waves or energy harnessed and put to use by man, whether their 
source is movable or immovable, are deemed corporeal movables.113 
According to the Quebec Minister of Justice’s comments to the CCQ, article 906 
establishes an irrefutable presumption that “seeks to eliminate any doubt as to 
the qualification of waves and other energy forms such as electricity, gas, or 
heat.”114 Article 906 likely includes forms of energy such as “sound and radiation” 
too.115 
The codal provision and the minister’s comments were not drafted with data 
in mind, as in the early 1990s the Internet had not yet become mainstream. 
Jurisprudence on the issue is also of little use in interpreting article 906 with regard 
to virtual property because it has generally dealt with tangible forms of energy like 
electric current or steam.116 Still, it seems probable that the magnetic fields and 
electrons that form the basis of virtual property could be considered corporeal 
movables under article 906. The organized electron sequence is “energy” and the 
ability of users to experience this information in the form of an image on a 
computer screen could be considered a “use by man.”117 Thus, virtual property 
likely falls within the scope of article 906.  
7.2.2  Virtual Property and the Issue of Appropriation 
Even though virtual property probably qualifies as a corporeal movable, 
under the civil law it cannot be considered property unless it is subject to 
appropriation. In the civil law, “things are considered property once they are 
publicly or privately appropriated or susceptible to such appropriation,”118 which 
necessarily “pre-supposes the pre-existence of ‘vacant’ or ‘wild’ things” from 
which property is fashioned.119 So, some scholars see a conceptual difficulty with 
                                                                                                                                            
113  Art 906 CCQ. 
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regard to the appropriation of virtual property.120 The fact that virtual property 
is, at its core, information has prompted authors including Paul Chênevert, 
Stéphane Gilker, and Charles Lupien to argue that the appropriation of virtual 
property would lead to legal absurdities.121  
Chênevert argues that if virtual property is the output of a command 
sequence that creates physical impressions on a hard disk, which is subject to 
appropriation, then it could lead to the absurd result of requiring the user to 
purchase the service provider’s hard drive.122 Meanwhile, Gilker and Lupien argue 
that it is possible to appropriate virtual property indirectly through movable 
accession under article 972 of the CCQ.123 They suggest that “the technical 
process of creating virtual property requires the user to save the information 
necessary to create the virtual property on the service provider’s server,”124 
modifying the hard drive. However, because the user’s work will generally (but 
not always) be worth less than the hard disk, the service provider would likely be 
required to compensate the user for his or her efforts.125 This result would be 
problematic, as it goes against the reasonable expectations of both users and 
service providers.  
In both cases, these authors do not examine the issue of appropriation from 
the moment that the property interest is created. While the line of code only 
becomes virtual property once it is rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected 
(which usually occurs when information is saved on a third-party server), the 
property interest in the line of code comes into existence at the moment the line 
of code is created, separate from the property interest in the user’s hardware.126 
A user who stores a document on his or her computer has a property interest in 
the data comprising the document when the first letter is typed in the word 
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processor,127 as it is at that moment that the electrical signals are appropriated, 
organized, and stored on the RAM of the user’s computer. A service provider 
then transfers and stores this property on the user’s behalf. By contrast, where a 
user accesses virtual property created by a service provider, as with e-books or 
virtual worlds, the service provider creates the property interest before storage on 
the server.  
Since code is made up of data that is transmitted and stored in the form of 
electrical signals, the process of creating code is simply the application of 
knowledge to arrange electrons inside a computer to some useful end. If the first 
law of thermodynamics is correct and “energy cannot be created or destroyed, 
only transferred,” then the electrons within the electrical signals that form data 
and allow it to be transferred or stored are “pre-existent.”128 Therefore, it is 
possible for a user to appropriate these electrical signals and store them on the 
property of others in much the same way that an individual can convert the kinetic 
energy of wind into a useful electrical by using turbine technology to store the 
energy on a neighbour’s battery. In both scenarios, one uses knowledge to store 
energy in a useful form, while giving meaning to article 906 of the CCQ. 
7.2.3  To the Extent that the Civil Law Recognizes Virtual Property, It Must 
Recognize a New Innominate Real Right to Access Virtual Property 
If the civil law recognizes the creation of a property interest in virtual 
property, then it must also recognize a new innominate real right for users to 
access their virtual property stored on a service provider’s servers. The value of a 
user’s property interest in virtual property depends entirely on the rights that a 
user may assert over the servers on which it is stored, notably the right of the user 
to access his or her virtual property.129 While Quebec law could regulate virtual 
property with property law, it currently provides no means of enforcing this 
property interest when virtual property resides on the servers of a service 
provider.  
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Under article 1119 of the CCQ, the nominate forms of dismemberments of 
the right of ownership are limited to usufruct,130 use,131 servitudes,132 and 
emphyteusis.133 These traditional forms of dismemberments of the right of 
ownership are largely unhelpful in the context of virtual property. First, use, 
servitudes, and emphyteusis do not contemplate the dismemberment of the rights 
of usus, fructus, or abusus in a movable in favour of another movable.134 Second, 
usufruct is unhelpful as it terminates on the death of the usufructuary.  
However, the real rights in relation to property (equivalent to rights in rem) 
created by article 1119 are not exhaustive. In the civil law, “jurisprudence and 
doctrine have generally admitted the existence of other innominate real rights” 
and these rights have been limited to: “logging rights, hunting and fishing rights, 
rights to exploit the public domain, and personal servitudes.”135 In Matamajaw 
Salmon Club v Duchaine,136 a decision that was affirmed by the Quebec Court of 
Appeal in Club Appalaches Inc v Quebec,137 the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council held that innominate real rights could be created in a distinct self-
contained property right “to a separable subject or incident of property,” like a 
fishing right that arises incidental to ownership of the riverbed.138 The Privy 
Council reasoned that: 
Article 406 [similar to article 947 of the CCQ139] says that “ownership 
is the right of enjoying and of disposing of things in the most absolute 
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manner, provided that no use be made of them which is prohibited by 
law or by regulations.” Article 408 [similar to article 948 of the CCQ140] 
provides that “ownership in a thing, whether moveable or 
immoveable, gives the right to all it produces, and to all that is joined 
to it as an accessory, whether naturally or artificially. This right is called 
the right of accession.” There appears to be no reason why, 
consistently with the language of these articles, there should not be 
ownership of a fishing right as a mode of enjoying and disposing of a 
separable physical subject for possession. The title to take the fish is a 
title to take a product of the river, and art. 408 recognises as possible in the 
law the union with it as an accessory of the right to use the bed of the river or the 
banks when naturally or artificially stipulated for as part of that which is joined to 
the fishing right.141 
Since the right to access fish is an accessory right to the ownership of the 
riverbed in which the fish live, it closely resembles the right to access virtual 
property. The nature of the Internet places the right to access data stored on the 
server as an important, valuable, and accessory dismemberment of the service 
provider’s hard drive ownership in favour of the user who owns the data stored 
on it. This dismemberment, which is created by the execution of an EULA or 
TOS, could constitute the creation of a perpetual, innominate real right to access 
virtual property following the logic of Club Appalaches, which held that innominate 
real rights could be created by a dismemberment of the right of ownership.142 
While an innominate right can exist as an accessory to virtual property, the 
nature of the right is not subject to any legal regime and is created entirely by a 
constituting act such as a contract.143 Despite being governed by a constitutive 
act, these rights do not exist in a legal vacuum. As a dismemberment of the right 
of ownership, these innominate rights cannot be greater than the property interest 
itself.144 Additionally, these rights are limited by public order.145 
While EULAs and TOS documents are used to govern the relationship 
between users and service providers, they should not form the basis for the 
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creation of an innominate real right in their current state. The structure of these 
agreements creates an almost feudal regime to regulate the relationship between 
users and service providers.146 This relationship would likely be considered 
against public order and incapable of forming an innominate dismemberment of 
the right of ownership.147 However, if a civilian court reduced the obligation on 
users as a result of the abusive clauses contained in the EULAs and TOS 
agreements, then the civil law would be more amenable to the recognition of a 
new innominate real right to access virtual property. 
As EULAs and TOS agreements are contracts of adhesion,148 civil courts 
have greater leeway to modify the obligations in such agreements to recognize 
the creation of an innominate real right to access virtual property. Article 1437 of 
the CCQ provides that: 
An abusive clause in a consumer contract or contract of adhesion is 
null, or the obligation arising from it may be reduced. 
An abusive clause is a clause which is excessively and unreasonably 
detrimental to the consumer or the adhering party and is therefore not 
in good faith; in particular, a clause which so departs from the 
fundamental obligations arising from the rules normally governing the 
contract that it changes the nature of the contract is an abusive 
clause.149 
Article 1437 has been used in the past to sanction “terms of unilateral 
termination” by one party for reasons lacking “valid motive, without notice or 
without warning.”150 Thus, this provision could probably be used to nullify the 
terms of EULAs and TOS agreements that allow providers to unilaterally 
terminate their services. In changing the scope of the obligations in these 
agreements, the right to access virtual property becomes a separate, innominate 
real right, forming a separate property interest. However, it is important to note 
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that, although it is possible and desirable to use article 1437 to re-characterize 
EULAs and TOS agreements, the recognition of property rights in virtual 
property would be a significant departure from the terms of contracts that often 
grant no rights to users in their virtual property and that unfairly characterize 
virtual property as intellectual property.  
Nevertheless, a court’s decision to imply terms into a contract of adhesion 
would not be unprecedented in the domain of virtual property. In Re Harp 
Investments Inc,151 the Quebec Superior Court implicitly recognized a client’s right 
to access the money in his bank account even though the account was in the name 
of a mandatary.152 Implying terms in a bank account contract is especially notable 
in the context of virtual property because a bank account is virtual property 
according to Fairfield’s definition.153 
8. WHY RECOGNIZING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN VIRTUAL PROPERTY WILL PROTECT  
THE REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF THE PARTIES 
Projecting the traditional Western understanding of property law into the 
virtual domain is necessary to protect the reasonable expectations of parties 
involved in virtual property transactions. If, as I have argued, virtual property is 
not intellectual property, then the law governing virtual property could be 
organized in a variety of ways to reflect this fact, ranging from the communal to 
the communist. However, as virtual property is designed to mimic real world 
property as it exists in North America,154 the use of traditional Western property 
law best protects the reasonable expectations of the parties. Not only does 
“mirroring the features of real-world systems…make sense to twenty-first-
century [users],” it also enables service providers to “attract the largest number 
of paying customers.”155  
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Service providers developed virtual property in response to the “ingrained 
assumptions” that users have about how reality should work.156 As such, it makes 
sense to start analyzing users’ virtual property rights, and the corresponding 
obligation of service providers to preserve that virtual property, from the 
normative structure governing the property from which virtual property is 
derived. This approach is to be preferred even as the traditional physical property 
regimes of the Canadian common law and civil law extend into the domain of 
virtual property, requiring a creative reconceptualization of some principles 
within our legal understanding of the law of property. This reconceptualization 
should be qualified by the norms of the service, which affect how relationships 
are interpreted between service providers and users, between users themselves, 
and between the virtual property and its physical hardware. Both the common 
and civil law recognize that certain legal principles must be interpreted 
subjectively, in light of prevailing societal norms. This concept most clearly 
manifests itself through the principle of good faith157 and the use of the 
reasonable person standard158 in regulating the relationships between individuals.  
In the property context, the notions of “property as a relationship” and 
“property as an object” underpin Western understanding of the legal 
framework.159 This understanding of property implies “not only a relationship to 
an object of social wealth but also a relationship with other individuals in respect 
to the object.”160 Others are excluded from these aforementioned relationships 
“and have a duty not to interfere” with the resulting property rights.161 Practically, 
this principle manifests itself as the vesting of control over property in a single 
person (or association of persons) with the ability to exclude others.162  
                                                                                                                                            
156  Ibid. 
157  Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71, [2014] 3 SCR 494; art 6 CCQ. 
158  Galaske v O’Donnell, [1994] 1 SCR 670, 112 DLR (4th) 109; art 1457 CCQ. 
159  David Lametti, “The Concept of Property: Relations through Objects of Social Wealth” (2003) 53 UTLJ 
325 at 327. 
160  Ibid at 335. 
161  Ibid.  
162  Ibid. 
92 VIRTUAL PROPERTY Vol. 24 
While the exclusionary rights associated with ownership may appear 
unfettered, in practice these ownership entitlements are much less absolute. 
David Lametti explains:  
[The] power to exclude is in part the cause of property’s inherent and 
ongoing controversial nature: it is one matter to say that one ought to 
have access to some resource, but giving someone the power to dictate 
the use of that resource to the exclusion of others—and, hence, giving 
someone power over others—is far more debatable. It is this fact that 
inevitably ties the existence and architecture of private property to its 
underlying justifications.163 
The extent of property rights must be determined on the basis that “the form that 
property takes will reflect the type and relative power or weight that the 
justification has in balancing out the other principles or imperatives.”164 As a 
result, the law of property has developed several mechanisms, such as easements, 
to protect vulnerable estates or dismemberments of ownership from the exclusive 
ownership interests of others. The contours and extent of the right of ownership 
over virtual property and its associated physical hardware should also be evaluated 
in light of the normative basis for each competing property interest, which are 
themselves qualified by the social norms of the service.  
As virtual property interests are both dependent and relational, they are 
particularly susceptible to being qualified by their normative context. First, as 
discussed above, virtual property is entirely dependent on the existence of the 
physical hardware that supports it. As such, a caveat should be placed on service 
providers’ rights in the hardware so that users may exercise their lesser virtual 
property interest. Second, as between users themselves, virtual property acts as 
the vehicle through which a user can interact with other actors in cyberspace (as 
users cannot physically interact with one another). As a result, the nature of these 
interactions, and the extent to which they can be regulated by another user’s 
virtual property, will likely be tempered by the norms that govern the social 
contract in which the virtual property interests operate.165 With this in mind, the 
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following pages canvass practical issues that are likely to arise as a result of 
recognizing property rights in virtual property and briefly discuss how the norms 
of a service could come to temper their negative effects.   
8.1 New Rights and Obligations  
Recognizing property rights in virtual property will give users new rights as 
against service providers and third parties. This would enable virtual property to 
become part of the user’s estate or patrimony and would be available not only to 
the user’s heirs, but also to the user’s creditors as security. Additionally, 
recognizing these rights will displace virtual property from the grey market, 
allowing users to sell their virtual property and subjecting the sale to transactional 
incidents, such as the payment of taxes. This will protect both users and 
purchasers by allowing them to contract without the risk that the service provider 
will terminate their accounts for violating the EULA or TOS. Moreover, both 
parties will benefit from the certainty of a conventional dispute resolution 
process, “since property gives rise to all the standard legal interests that 
accompany property ownership.”166 
However, for reasons already mentioned, the rights afforded to users cannot 
be homogeneous across the spectrum of virtual property. The rights to be 
acquired by users are based on the ability of the particular type of virtual property 
to mimic real world property and on the social norms of the service. Users 
develop expectations based on the virtual item’s ability to replace a real world 
object. For example, when a user purchases an e-book, he or she should receive 
a permanent property interest because users expect to continue to have access to 
the information contained in an e-book once it is stored in their virtual library. It 
is reasonably foreseeable that users could build a library of rivalrous code that 
grows to contain gigabytes of information. By contrast, a user may only expect to 
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maintain ownership of property purchased in virtual worlds for as long as the 
game is in service. After all, a sword in World of Warcraft has no practical use or 
value outside of the virtual environment.  
Service providers will have an obligation to respect users’ virtual property 
interests. This is a duty that flows from the property right held by the user in the 
virtual property, as well as from the accessory rights that are crucial to the virtual 
property’s existence and that the user would have over the service provider’s hard 
drives and certain other non-virtual property.167 Grounding the service provider’s 
obligations in the framework created by traditional property rights provides both 
parties with a clear and comprehensive regime to manage their competing 
property interests. For instance, both the common law and civil law recognize 
that property owners who place their property in the care of others are afforded 
certain protections. Under the law of bailments and under articles 1299–1373 of 
the CCQ (administration of property of others), a person who takes possession 
of another’s property has an obligation to return that property as soon as the time 
or use for or condition on which it was delivered has elapsed or been 
performed.168 If it is recognized that a user has a property interest in virtual 
property, then the nature of the obligation on service providers to return virtual 
property to users will depend not only on the EULA or TOS, but also on the 
“specific circumstances” that determine how the parties are expected to act.169 
These specific circumstances generate norms that define what rights users have 
in their virtual property and the limits to how these rights can be asserted against 
service providers. The sophisticated body of law associated with these rights, as 
well as the mechanisms developed in the law of contracts and extra-contractual 
obligations, creates a framework for their orderly extinction.  
The same is true for the accessory rights attached to ownership of virtual 
property, which affect the service provider’s physical property interests. As a 
practical result of their obligations, service providers will need to take greater care 
to protect a user’s virtual property from unforeseen events that could damage 
their servers like natural disasters. Moreover, they will not be permitted to 
                                                                                                                                            
167  See Part 7, above. 
168  Ziff, supra note 54 at 320; art 1301 CCQ. 
169  Ziff, supra note 54 at 325. 
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arbitrarily terminate access to virtual property and will need to provide users with 
a reasonable opportunity to retrieve their information. Service providers will also 
be limited in their ability to circumscribe the virtual property rights that users 
receive and will be required to take reasonable steps to protect the value of 
purchased virtual property, in accordance with the norms of the service. This 
might require service providers to remove digital locks at the termination of 
service in order to allow users to retain a usable interest in their virtual property.  
8.2 The Norms of a Service Limit Users’ Rights and Recourse Against One 
Another 
The exercise of a user’s rights in virtual property is limited by the legal and 
societal norms of the service. One of the arguments against recognizing of virtual 
property rights, especially in virtual worlds, is that it would make game play more 
litigious due to the clash between property law and the norms of the service.170 
One concern is that there would be claims for trespass on virtual property in 
games where such interactions are permitted or encouraged. However, these 
concerns are largely unfounded, as the law already recognizes environments 
where societal norms temper legal ones. For instance, in hockey games, fighting 
and checking are commonplace behaviours and sometimes result in serious 
injuries. Nevertheless, there are few successful claims in damages for injuries 
caused within the rules of the game:171 
Sports maintain internal rules and structures to regulate play and 
organize competition. In sports law, the wider legal system impinges 
on this traditionally private sphere and subjects the politics of the sport 
game to the politics of the law game.172 
These internal rules create norms that limit the rights that participants may assert 
against one another, protecting the ability of these activities to self-regulate. 
                                                                                                                                            
170  Christopher Cifrino, “Virtual Property, Virtual Rights: Why Contract Law, Not Property Law, Must Be the 
Governing Paradigm in the Law of Virtual Worlds” (2014) 55 BC L Rev 235 at 259–60. 
171  Lastowka, supra note 8 at 110–2. 
172  John Barnes, Sports and the Law in Canada, 3d ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1996) at 2.  
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In cyberspace, the social norms of a particular service control which 
property rights users may assert against service providers and other users. For 
example, in a virtual world where players are encouraged to steal from others, 
“victims” could not bring actions against one another following the theft of their 
virtual property. However, if one user were to steal the files of another user on a 
cloud service like Dropbox, the thief could not claim immunity under the norms 
of that service.  
8.3 Service Providers Are Protected from Unlimited Liability when 
Modifying their Services 
Similarly, depending on the nature of the service, service providers could be 
protected from claims by users whose virtual property has been devalued or 
destroyed due to a change in the nature of the service. Virtual economies, much 
like real ones, are subject to manipulation by national governments as well as 
manufacturers. Even in “free market, capitalist” economies some form of 
economic regulation by government or industry occurs. To varying degrees, 
governments manage economic development through monetary, fiscal, 
economic, and social policies, while industries control product supply. 
Governments can print more money to devalue their currencies, and 
manufacturers can flood the market to lower prices.  
However, unless one party warrants to another that it will maintain a certain 
level of supply, it is unlikely that a claim against a manufacturer or government 
for reducing property value will succeed; yet, it is possible that the total 
expropriation of a virtual property interest—outside the norms of the service—
would require the service provider to compensate the user for his or her loss.  
8.4 Service Providers Are Protected from Unlimited Liability at Termination 
of the Service 
Establishing a property regime for virtual property will provide for an 
orderly windup of services, protecting users’ property interests without creating 
unlimited liability for service providers. The rules of property canvassed in this 
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article are flexible enough to allow service providers to terminate service and still 
protect the core of users’ property interests.  
In property law, the liberty of ownership clashes with the utility of public 
rights over private land. On the one hand, property law seeks to protect owners 
from encumbrances on their right of ownership.173 On the other hand, it 
recognizes that, for public policy reasons, there are cases in which one property 
owner should be able to exercise rights over the land of other property owners.174 
To balance these competing interests, property law recognizes that charges over 
property in favour of another may be terminated if those charges become too 
onerous.175 Such termination occurs in an orderly and fair manner to ensure that 
the owner of the servient property interest acts reasonably to protect the value of 
the dominant property interest.176 
In all likelihood, service providers will not be allowed to unilaterally delete a 
user’s virtual property on termination of the service. Instead, they will be forced 
to provide users an opportunity to retain a useable property interest in the code, 
preventing the mega losses inflicted by Megaupload from reoccurring. This could 
be achieved either by giving users a reasonable amount of time to transfer their 
data off of third-party servers or by requiring providers to remove digital locks 
that obstruct third parties from offering alternative solutions to access users’ 
virtual property.  
                                                                                                                                            
173  “Ownership is the right to use, enjoy and dispose of property fully and freely, subject to the limits and 
conditions for doing so determined by law.” See art 947 CCQ. 
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175  Ziff, supra note 54 at 423–6; art 1189 CCQ. 
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98 VIRTUAL PROPERTY Vol. 24 
9. CONCLUSION 
As large-scale shutdowns of service providers are still few and far between, 
there has yet to be a strong test case that defines the nature of the rights and 
obligations between digital content users and service providers. However, as the 
acquisition of virtual property and the consumption of virtual content continue 
their growth, the construction of this relationship will have multi-billion-dollar 
consequences. 
While the regulation of virtual property though contract and intellectual 
property law has become the industry standard, it mischaracterizes the nature of 
virtual property and prevents both service providers and users from maximizing 
the efficient exploitation of cyberspace as an economic and social space. The 
imperative to reset the relationship between service provider and user is greater 
than ever following the decision in Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi Inc,177 which 
prevents American users from reselling their used digital content due to copyright 
infringement.  
From a practical perspective, the use of property law to govern virtual 
property most closely reflects the reasonable expectations of the parties, 
especially since virtual property is designed to mimic real world property. From a 
legal perspective, both the common and civil law of property recognize that both 
the rivalrous code sequence and the right to access it could be subject to the rules 
of property, a recognition supported by traditional positivist justifications for the 
creation of property rights. Thus, it is plausible that courts could reinterpret 
EULAs and TOS agreements to recognize property rights. However, even if users 
were able to circumvent the arbitration clauses in these contracts of adhesion, a 
decision would likely come too late to protect billions of dollars of virtual 
property from destruction.  
In the end, the responsibility for protecting users from service providers will 
fall on provincial legislatures. If one accepts that virtual property has a dualistic 
nature, which allows for the intermingling of a service provider’s intellectual 
property interests in the work with the user’s property interest in a unique 
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rivalrous code sequence, then it is possible for the provinces to circumvent federal 
intellectual property statutes by legislating a more equitable virtual property 
regime. Ultimately, the digital age will be defined by how society comes to govern 
this relationship. Without careful governance, we risk preserving cyberspace as a 
feudal fiefdom, whereby users and their virtual property are subject to the whims 
of self-interested service providers.  
  
